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Abstract
This paper presents a formal framework for compositional reasoning about secure systems. A key insight
is to view a trusted system in terms of the interfaces that the various components expose: larger trusted
components are built by combining interface calls in known ways; the adversary is conﬁned to the interfaces
it has access to, but may combine interface calls without restriction. Compositional reasoning for such
systems is based on an extension of rely-guarantee reasoning for system correctness [27,21] to a setting
that involves an adversary whose exact program is not known. At a technical level, the paper presents an
expressive concurrent programming language with recursive functions for modeling interfaces and a logic
of programs in which compositional reasoning principles are formalized and proved sound with respect to
trace semantics. The methods are illustrated through a small fragment of an idealized ﬁle system.
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1 Introduction
Compositional security is a recognized scientiﬁc challenge for trustworthy comput-
ing (see, for example, Bellovin [5], Mitchell [28], Wing [35]). Contemporary systems
are built up from smaller components. However, even if each component is secure
in isolation, the composed system may not achieve the desired end-to-end security
property: an adversary may exploit complex interactions between components to
compromise security. Such attacks have shown up in the wild in many diﬀerent
settings, including web browsers and infrastructure [3,4,20,10,19], network proto-
cols and infrastructure [26,2,29,22,35], and application and systems software [34,8].
While there has been progress on understanding secure composition in speciﬁc set-
tings, such as information ﬂow control for non-interference-style properties [24,23,25]
and cryptographic protocols [17,9,31,12,6,11], a systematic understanding of the
general problem of secure composition has not emerged yet.
This paper makes a contribution in this space. We present a formal framework
for compositional reasoning about secure systems, incorporating two main insights.
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First, we posit that a general theory of secure composition should enable one to ﬂex-
ibly model and parametrically reason about diﬀerent classes of adversaries. This
is critical because while speciﬁc domains may have a canonical adversary model
(e.g., the standard network adversary model for cryptographic protocols), it is un-
reasonable to expect that a standard adversary model can be developed for all of
system security. To develop such a theory we view a trusted system in terms of
the interfaces that the various components expose: larger trusted components are
built by combining interface calls in known ways; the adversary is conﬁned to the
interfaces it has access to, but may combine interface calls without restriction. Such
interface-conﬁned adversaries are precisely modeled in our framework and provide
a generic way to model diﬀerent classes of adversaries. For example, in virtual
machine monitor-based secure systems, we can model an adversarial guest operat-
ing system by conﬁning it to the interface exposed by the virtual machine monitor
(VMM). Similarly, adversary models for web browsers, such as the gadget adver-
sary [4], can be modeled by conﬁning the adversary to the read and write interfaces
for frames guarded by the same origin policy as well as the frame navigation policies.
Second, we develop compositional reasoning principles for such systems in a rich
logic of programs. A salient feature of our logic is that program speciﬁcations can
use temporal operators, which allows them to relate not only the states and actions
at the beginning and end of a program, but also at all points in between. This
is essential because most properties of interest to us are safety properties [1] that
must hold throughout a program’s execution. In this regard our work is similar
to prior work on analysis of network protocols [13]. We further enrich the rea-
soning principles by extending ideas from rely-guarantee reasoning [27,21]. While
rely-guarantee reasoning was developed for proving correctness properties of known
concurrent programs, we extend it to soundly reason about system security in the
presence of interface-conﬁned adversaries. These principles generalize prior work on
compositional logics for network protocol analysis [12,13,33,18] and secure systems
analysis [14] and are also related to a recently proposed type system for modularly
checking interfaces of security protocols [6] (see Section 2 for a detailed comparison).
At a technical level, the paper presents an expressive concurrent programming
language with recursive functions for modeling system interfaces and interface-
conﬁned adversaries. Speciﬁcally, the programming language is based on an un-
typed, ﬁrst-order, concurrent version of the lambda-calculus with side-eﬀects (Sec-
tion 3 presents more details). Security properties are speciﬁed in a logic of programs
(also described in Section 3). Compositional reasoning principles are codiﬁed in
the proof system for the logic of programs to support modular reasoning about
program speciﬁcations (Section 4.1), trusted programs whose programs are known
(Section 4.2) and interface-conﬁned adversarial (untrusted) code (Section 4.3). We
present the formal semantics for the logic of programs and the main technical result
of the paper—a proof of the soundness of the proof system with respect to the trace
semantics of the logic (Section 5). Finally, we describe how the proof rules support
rely-guarantee reasoning in the presence of adversaries (Section 6). Concluding
remarks and directions for future work appear in Section 7.
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We illustrate our methods by applying them to an idealized ﬁle system whose
access control matrix protects its own integrity through a special ‘administrate’
permission, and a homework administration application running on the ﬁle system.
The interface-based view is useful both in modeling the ﬁle system’s interfaces
that are composed in known ways by the application and in ﬂexibly modeling the
adversary. Our illustrative proofs exercise all compositional reasoning principles
developed in this paper. Further examples, including a simpliﬁed web mashup and
an analysis of secrecy in the Kerberos V5 protocol can be found in the full version
of this paper [16].
2 Related Work
We discuss below closely related work on logic-based and language-based approaches
for compositional security. Orthogonal approaches to secure composition of cryp-
tographic protocols include work on identifying syntactic conditions that are suﬃ-
cient to guarantee safe composition [17,11]. Another orthogonal approach to secure
composition is taken in the universal composability or reactive simulatibility [9,31]
projects. These simulation-based deﬁnitions when satisﬁed can provide strong com-
position guarantees. However, they have been so far applied primarily to crypto-
graphic primitives and protocols.
Compositional Logics of Security. The framework presented in this paper is
inspired by and generalizes prior work on logics of programs for network protocol
analysis [12,13,33,18] and secure systems analysis [14]. At a conceptual level, a sig-
niﬁcant new idea is the use of interface-level abstractions to modularly build trusted
systems and ﬂexibly model adversaries with diﬀerent capabilities by conﬁning them
to stipulated interfaces. In contrast, prior work lacked the interface abstraction and
had a ﬁxed adversary. Also, the actions (side-eﬀects) in the language were ﬁxed in
prior work to communication actions, cryptographic operations, and certain opera-
tions on shared memory. On the other hand, our programming model and logic are
parametric in actions. One advantage of this generality is that the compositional
reasoning principles (proof rules) are action-independent and can be applied to a
variety of systems, thus getting at the heart of the problem of compositional secu-
rity (see Section 3.1 for details of the parametrization). We expect domain-speciﬁc
reasoning to be codiﬁed using axioms; thus, the set of axioms for reasoning about
network protocols that use cryptographic primitives will be diﬀerent from those
for reasoning about trusted computing platforms. The treatment of rely-guarantee
reasoning in the presence of adversaries generalizes the invariant rule schemas for
authentication [12], integrity [14], and secrecy [33] properties developed earlier.
Reﬁnement types for verifying protocols. Recently, Bhargavan et al. have
developed a type system to modularly check interfaces of security protocols, imple-
mented it, and applied it to analysis of secrecy properties of cryptographic proto-
cols [6]. Their approach is based on reﬁnement types, i.e, ordinary types qualiﬁed
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with logical assertions, which can be used to specify program invariants and pre-
and post-conditions. Programmers annotate various points in the model with as-
sumed and asserted facts. The main safety theorem states that all programmer
deﬁned assertions are implied by programmer assumed facts in a well-typed pro-
gram. However, a semantic connection between the program state and the logical
formulas representing assumed and asserted facts is missing. In contrast, we prove
that the inference system of our logic of programs is sound with respect to trace
semantics of the programming language. Our logic of programs may provide a se-
mantic foundation for the work of Bhargavan et al. and, dually, the implementation
in that work may provide a basis for mechanizing the formal system presented in
this paper. Bhargavan et al.’s programming model is more expressive than ours
because it allows higher-order functions. We intend to add higher-order functions
to our framework in the near future.
3 Programming Model and Security Properties
We start by describing our formalism for modeling systems and a logic of programs
for specifying and reasoning about their security properties. In Section 3.1, we
describe a concurrent programming language for modeling systems. Section 3.2
introduces our running example. Section 3.3 presents the logic of programs that
is used to express security properties of systems modeled in the programming lan-
guage.
3.1 Programming Model
We model a system as a set of concurrent threads, each of which executes a sequen-
tial program. The threads may or may not be located on the same machine. The
program of each thread may either be available for analysis, in which case we call the
thread trusted, or it may be unknown, in which case we call the thread untrusted
or adversarial. The program of a thread consists of atomic steps called actions and
control constructs like conditionals and sequencing. Actions model all operations
other than control ﬂow including side-eﬀect free operations like encryption, decryp-
tion, and cryptographic signature creation and veriﬁcation, as well as inter-thread
interaction through network message sending and receiving, shared-memory reading
and writing, etc. In the formal description of our programming model, its opera-
tional semantics, and reasoning principles, we treat actions abstractly, denoting
them with the letter a in the syntax of programs and representing their behavior
with sound axioms in the logic of programs. The soundness theorem presented in
this paper is general, and applies whenever axioms chosen to codify properties of
actions are sound.
In the interest of security, programs may not have access to all actions used to
model a system. Instead, programs may be limited to using a set of trusted interfaces
that are exposed by the system. Formally, an interface is a function f(x)

= e, with
name f , argument x, and body e. The body may execute actions and interfaces,
including itself, thus allowing for both recursion and mutual recursion. Recursive
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interfaces are important in many settings especially servers that listen for client
requests, process them, and then loop back to the listening state.
Formally, the sequential program of each thread is described by an expression e
in the following language. t denotes a term that can be passed as arguments, and
over which variables x range. We do not stipulate a ﬁxed syntax for terms; they may
include integers, Booleans, keys, signatures, tuples, etc. However, our language is
ﬁrst-order, so terms may not contain expressions. To simplify reasoning principles,
the language is interpreted functionally: all expressions and actions must return a
term to the calling site and variables bind to terms. Mutable state, if needed, may
be modeled as a separate syntactic entity whose contents can be updated through
actions, as illustrated in an example later in this section.
Expressions e ::= t | act a | let(e1, x.e2) | if(b, e1, e2) | call(f, t)
Function defns ::= f(x)

= e
The expression t returns term t to its caller. act a evaluates the action a, potentially
causing side-eﬀects. let(e1, x.e2) executes e1 ﬁrst, then binds the term obtained
from its evaluation to the variable x and evaluates e2. if(b, e1, e2) evaluates e1 if b
is true and evaluates e2 otherwise. call(f, t) calls function f with argument t: if
f(x)

= e then call(f, t) evaluates to e{t/x}. (Ξ{t/x} denotes the usual capture-
avoiding substitution of the term t for the variable x in the syntactic entity Ξ.)
Operational Semantics. The operational semantics of our programming language
deﬁne how a conﬁguration, the collection of all simultaneously executing threads
of the system and shared state, reduces one step at a time. Formally, a conﬁgu-
ration C contains a set of threads T1, . . . , Tn and a shared state σ. We treat the
state abstractly in our formal speciﬁcation; it may be instantiated to model shared
memory as well as the network which holds messages in transit depending on the
application. The state may change when threads perform actions, e.g., a send action
by one thread may add an undelivered message to the network part of the state.
Such interaction between the state and actions is captured in the reduction rule for
actions, as described below.
A thread is a triple I;K; e containing a unique thread identiﬁer I, an execution
stack K and an expression e that is currently executing in the thread (also called
active expression of the thread) . The execution stack records the calling context
of the active expression as a sequence of frames.
Thread id I
Frame F ::= x.e
Stack K ::= [] | F :: K
Thread T ::= I ;K ; e
Conﬁguration C ::= σ  T1, . . . , Tn
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σ ; I  a → σ′ ; I  t eval t t′
σ  I ; (x.e) :: K ; act a ↪→ σ′  I ;K ; e{t′/x} red-act
σ  I ;K ; let(e1, x.e2) ↪→ σ  I ; (x.e2) :: K ; e1
red-let
x
σ  Ti ↪→ σ′  T ′i
σ  T1, . . . , Ti, . . . , Tn −→ σ′  T1, . . . , T ′i , . . . , Tn
red-conﬁg
Fig. 1. Operational semantics, selected rules
Selected reduction rules for our language are shown in Figure 1. (Remaining rules
are in the full version of this paper [16].) The rules are parametric in judgments
for evaluating actions a and terms t, both of which are treated abstractly. The
judgment eval t t′ means that term t evaluates completely to the term t′. For
example, in a model that includes standard arithmetic, a concrete instance of the
judgment would be eval (3 + 5) 8. The judgment σ ; I  a → σ′ ; I  t means that
action a when executed in thread I updates the shared state σ to σ′ and returns
term t. As an example, in a system with shared memory, σ may be a map from
locations l to terms t, the action write l, t may change contents of location l to t,
and the following judgment may hold: σ ; I  write l, t → σ[l → t] ; I  ().
Our primary reduction relation, that for conﬁgurations, has the form C −→ C′.
It interleaves reductions of individual threads in the conﬁguration in an arbitrary
order (rule red-conﬁg). Reductions of threads are formalized by a reduction relation
for threads: σ  T ↪→ σ′  T ′. This reduction relation is standard for functional
programs with side-eﬀects and we omit its description. Reductions caused by exe-
cution of actions are called eﬀectual reductions (rule red-act in the ﬁgure) whereas
others are called administrative reductions.
Our reasoning principles establish properties of traces. A trace T is a ﬁnite
sequence of reductions C −→ C′ starting from an initial conﬁguration. We associate
a time point u with every reduction on a trace. A time point is either a real number
or −∞ or ∞. The only constraint on time points associated with a trace is that
they be monotonically increasing along the trace. Diagrammatically, we represent
a trace as follows (ui is the time at which Ci−1 reduces to Ci.)
u0−→ C0 u1−→ C1 . . . un−→ Cn
We assume that individual reduction steps happen instantaneously at the time
associated with them on the trace and that the state σ on the trace does not
change between two consecutive reductions. Speciﬁcally, in the above illustration,
if Ci = σi  Ti,1, . . . , Ti,n, then we assume that the state of the trace is σi in the
interval [ui, ui+1). u0 is called the start time of the trace. In addition to the sequence
of reductions and time points, a trace may also include auxiliary information, such
as contents of state at the start time.
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File Mutable Data Structures
C : ﬁlename → data
P : (ﬁlename ∗ prin ∗ perm) set
File System Interfaces
F = {permadd, readfs, writefs,
send, recv, lock, unlock}
permadd(f, k, p)

=
lock(P );
let s = read(P ) in
if ((f, self prin, ad) ∈ s)
then unlock(P ); insert(P, (f, k, p))
else unlock(P )
readfs(f)

=
lock(P );
let s = read(P ) in
if ((f, self prin, re) ∈ s)
then unlock(P );C(f)
else unlock(P )
writefs(f, d)

=
lock(P );
let s = read(P ) in
if ((f, self prin, wr) ∈ s)
then unlock(P ); update(C, f, d)
else unlock(P )
Files and Principal in Classroom
Special principal: Teacher
N students: s[1], . . . , s[N ]
N homework ﬁles: f [1], . . . , f [N ]
Initial Access Control Matrix, P
{(f [1],Teacher, ad), . . . , (f [N ],Teacher, ad)}
Known Programs
Code of principal Teacher:
teacher body = teacher loop();
teacher loop()

=
(n, p) = recv;
if (p = re ∨ p = wr)
then permadd(f [n], s[n], p)
else ();
teacher loop()
Fig. 2. File system with access control (left) and an application on it (right)
3.2 A File System Example
We introduce an illustrative, running example of an idealized ﬁle system that uses
an access control matrix for security. We represent the ﬁle system using two ab-
stract, mutable data structures that are part of the shared state σ from Section 3.1:
a map C from ﬁle names to ﬁle contents, and a set P of tuples (ﬁle name, principal,
permission), which represents the access control matrix. Principal k has permission
p on ﬁle f if and only if (f, k, p) ∈ P . We use three permissions: read (re), write
(wr), and administrate (ad). The last permission allows a principal to add per-
missions for other principals on the relevant ﬁle. Both data structures are shared
between the ﬁle system and users, some of whom may be malicious.
Actions. Our model includes several primitive actions a, which we describe infor-
mally and whose formal details we elide. Two actions – C(f) and update(C, f, d)
– read the ﬁle f and write the contents d to ﬁle f , respectively (recall that C is
the map from ﬁle names to their contents). Note that these actions do not make
any access checks; the latter are performed by interfaces that wrap the actions as
described below. Actions lock(P ) and unlock(P ) obtain and release an exclusive-
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write lock on the access control matrix P . The lock is necessary to avoid write-write
and read-write races on the matrix. Action read(P ) reads the access control matrix,
while insert(P, (f, k, p)) inserts the triple (f, k, p) into the access control matrix.
Finally, we have actions send(m), that sends a message m on the network (we as-
sume that the source and destination ﬁelds of a message can be spoofed, so we do
not model them), and recv that receives a message from the network.
Interfaces. Since the actions C(f), update(C, f, d), and insert(P, (f, k, p)) do
not perform any access control checks, they are not directly accessible to programs.
Instead, programs are allowed to execute these actions only through ﬁxed inter-
faces that the ﬁle system exposes. This is characteristic of our modeling approach:
we limit programs to stipulated interfaces that make security relevant checks, even
though low-level actions may not be secure in themselves. Interfaces relevant to this
example – readfs, writefs, and permadd – are shown in Figure 2. For better read-
ability, we omit the keywords act and call from programs and write let(e1, x.e2) as
let x = e1 in e2. We assume that each thread runs on behalf of a principal, whose
permissions apply to the thread. The term self prin in a program dynamically
binds to the principal who owns the executing thread (a la the system call getuid()
in POSIX). The body of each interface checks relevant access permissions in P be-
fore calling C(f), update(C, f, d), or insert(P, (f, k, p)). Programs may use the
other actions send, recv, lock, and unlock directly, so the set of primitives avail-
able to programs is F = {permadd, readfs, writefs, send, recv, lock, unlock}.
Application Program. As an application of our ﬁle system, we consider a home-
work administration system. Assume that a classroom containing one principal
Teacher and N students s[1], . . . , s[N ] shares our ﬁle system. Each student s[n] has
a dedicated ﬁle f [n] that she can use to submit her homework. The application
consists of one server program called teacher loop in Figure 2 run by the teacher
and any number of programs run by students (and other adversaries) that are only
constrained in that they are conﬁned to the interfaces F deﬁned above. Initially,
the teacher has administrate permission (ad) on all ﬁles and there are no other per-
missions. The teacher’s program listens to student requests to give them read and
write permissions. The program receives a student id n and a permission p over the
network, and if the latter is read or write, gives student s[n] permission p over ﬁle
f [n]. (Having so obtained permissions, students can call the interfaces readfs and
writefs to read and write their homework ﬁles, respectively.)
Security Property. We are interested in proving the following security property of
our application: if ﬁle f [n] is updated by thread i, then the owner of thread i is s[n],
i.e., only a student can change her homework ﬁle. Even though this property may
seem obvious, its proof depends on a number of initial assumptions, and properties
of interfaces and the program of the teacher, and illustrates all reasoning principles
of our framework. The following is an outline of the proof. First, we prove two
invariants: 1) The teacher never adds any administrate permission, and 2) In order
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to add a permission on a ﬁle, a principal must have administrate permission on the
ﬁle. Together with the assumption that initially only the teacher has administrate
permissions, (1) and (2) imply that: 3) Only the teacher ever has administrate
permissions. Next, we prove that: 4) The teacher adds write permission on f [n]
only for s[n]. Finally, we prove that: 5) In order to update a ﬁle, a thread must
have write permission on the ﬁle. Together, (2)–(5) imply our security property.
Technically, properties (1) and (4) follow from an analysis of the known program
of the teacher, using principles introduced in Section 4.2. Properties (2) and (5)
depend on the behavior of all threads, including those that are adversarial, so they
must be proved by an analysis of available interfaces F only (Section 4.3). Property
(3) requires rely-guarantee reasoning because its proof is inductive (Section 6). We
sketch some of these proofs formally in subsequent sections.
3.3 Security Properties
We represent security properties as formulas of a logic whose syntax is shown below.
Formulas ϕ,ψ ::= p @ u | b | t = t′ | u1 ≤ u2 | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ¬ϕ | 	 | ⊥ |
∀x.ϕ | ∃x.ϕ
The formula p @ u means that the atomic formula p holds at time u (on the trace
against which the formula is being interpreted). p @ u is a hybrid modality [32,7].
It is known that all operators of linear temporal logic (LTL) can be expressed using
p @ u and quantiﬁers, so this logic is at least as expressive as LTL. In addition
to increasing expressiveness, using a hybrid logic instead of LTL allows us to ex-
press order between actions in security properties in an intuitive manner, facilitates
reasoning about invariants of programs modularly (Section 4) and also facilitates
rely-guarantee reasoning without the need for additional induction principles (Sec-
tion 6).
b denotes a Boolean term from the syntax of the language. Atomic formulas p
are terms applied to predicates, which may represent either the execution of certain
actions (corresponding to the language’s actions a) or properties of state. For ex-
ample, a predicate isACM(s) that checks that the access control matrix P is the set
s may be deﬁned by saying that T |= isACM(s) @ u if and only if, in trace T , at time
u, the access control matrix is s. Similarly, in protocol analysis, T |= Enc(I, t, k) @ u
may hold if and only if thread I in trace T encrypts term t with key k at time u.
Example 1. As an illustration, we formalize in our logic the security property
described at the end of Section 3.2. Suppose that the predicate Update(i, f, d) holds
at time u if at time u, thread i executes the action update(C, f, d) and predicate
Owner(i, k) means that principal k owns threads i. 1 Then, the following formula
1 Technically, the syntax of our logic requires us to write the suﬃx . . . @ u after each atomic formula.
However, Owner(i, k) @ u is independent of u, so we elide the suﬃx . . . @ u after Owner(i, k).
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means that only student s[n] can update ﬁle f [n].
∀i, u, n, d. (Update(i, f [n], d) @ u) ⊃ Owner(i, s[n])
Logic of Programs. On top of the temporal logic described above, we build a
logic of programs to reason about properties of traces obtained by executing known
or interface-conﬁned programs. Prior experience with security analysis of proto-
cols [12,13,33,18] and trusted computing platforms [14] shows that in addition to
standard post-conditions that hold when a program completes execution, analysis
of secure systems often requires reasoning about properties that hold while a pro-
gram executes. We call such properties invariants and introduce a novel construct
to represent them.
Speciﬁcally, we express pre- and post-conditions as well as invariants using six
kinds of assertions, generically denoted μ, ν.
Assertions μ, ν ::= [e]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ | {e}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ |
[f ]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ | {f}〈y, ub, ue, i〉ϕ |
[]〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ | [a]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ
In these assertions, ub, ue, i, x, y are bound variables whose scope is ϕ. (Recall that
ϕ denotes a formula in the temporal logic described earlier.) The intuitive meanings
of the six assertions are listed below; formal semantics are postponed to Section 5.
- [e]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ: If program expression e executes completely during the interval
(ub, ue] in thread i and returns value x, then ϕ holds.
- {e}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ: If program expression e is active in thread i at time ub and does
not return until time ue, then ϕ holds.
- [f ]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ: If function f is called with argument y in thread i at time
ub and executes completely during the interval (ub, ue] returning value x, then ϕ
holds.
- {f}〈y, ub, ue, i〉ϕ: If function f is called with argument y in thread i at time ub
and has not returned until time ue, then ϕ holds.
- []〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ: If thread i does not perform any eﬀectual reduction in the interval
(ub, ue], then ϕ holds. (Recall from Section 3.1 that an eﬀectual reduction is the
reduction of an action, as opposed to the reduction of a control ﬂow construct.)
- [a]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ: If in thread i, the active expression at time ub is act a, and this
expression executes at time ue returning x, then ϕ holds.
Our reasoning principles (Section 4) are parametric in the variables y,ub,ue, i,x
and our logic’s formal semantics relate assertions to traces for all ground instances
of these variables. Assertions [e]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ and [f ]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ specify the
behavior of programs that complete execution. They are generalizations of partial
correctness assertions from other program logic based type-theories like Hoare Type
Theory (HTT) [30]. We do not need to specify pre- and post-conditions separately
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because we can encode them in ϕ using the construct p @ u. For example, consider
the function f(x)

= let((act read l), z. (act write l, z + x)) that increments
the contents of the private memory location l by its argument x. We can specify
this function in our logic of programs as [f ]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉 ∀z. (Mem(l, z) @ ub ⊃
Mem(l, y + z) @ ue) ∧ x = (), where Mem(l, z) means that location l contains value
z. Note that the variable x in the body of the function diﬀers from the x in
its speciﬁcation. In the former case, the variable is the argument of the function
whereas in the latter case it is the result of the function.
The assertions {e}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ and {f}〈y, ub, ue, i〉ϕ specify invariants of pro-
grams – ϕ holds while the program (e or f) is executing. Prior work on Protocol
Composition Logic [12,13,33,18] and the Logic of Secure Systems [14] encodes in-
variants using standard partial correctness assertions and a notion of preﬁxes of a
program. However, preﬁxes are impossible to deﬁne in the presence of function calls
and recursion. Our treatment is novel and strictly more general because it allows
for speciﬁcation of invariants of programs with all control ﬂow constructs.
Whereas Section 4 presents a proof system for establishing the four assertions
[e]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ, {e}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ, [f ]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ, and {f}〈y, ub, ue, i〉ϕ, we do not
stipulate rules for establishing the remaining two assertions,
[]〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ and [a]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ that specify properties of administrative reduc-
tions and eﬀectual reductions, respectively. Instead, these two assertions must be
established through sound axioms that would depend on the representation of state
and actions chosen; the proof rules for establishing the other four assertions use
these two assertions as black-boxes. Our proof system’s soundness theorem ap-
plies whenever the axioms chosen for establishing these two classes of assertions are
sound.
Thread-Local Reasoning. A salient feature of our logic of programs is that the
speciﬁcations of a program, if established, hold irrespective of actions of threads
other than the one in which the program executes. This is implicit in the intuitive
meanings of the assertions above as well as the formal semantics of the logic (Sec-
tion 5). For example, the meaning of [e]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ is that if program expression
e executes completely during the interval (ub, ue] in thread i and returns value x,
then ϕ holds. Since this interpretation does not constrain what other threads do,
ϕ holds irrespective of the reductions that other threads may have performed in the
interim. As in prior work [13], this local property of the proof system simpliﬁes
reasoning signiﬁcantly since we do not have to reason about reductions of other
threads when we wish to prove a property that is speciﬁc to a thread (e.g., that the
thread does not write a certain location).
Example 2. Suppose that the predicate Insert(i, (f, k, p)) holds at time u if thread
i executes the action insert(P, (f, k, p)) at time u. Then, property (1) from the end
of Section 3.2, which states the teacher’s program never adds any administrative
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permissions, can be expressed as the following invariant of teacher body:
{teacher body}〈ub, ue, i〉
∀u, f, k. ((ub < u ≤ ue) ⊃ (¬Insert(i, (f, k, ad)) @ u))
4 Compositional Reasoning Principles
Next, we present a proof system that codiﬁes compositional reasoning principles
for establishing assertions about programs as well as security properties. In addi-
tion to standard rules for proving temporal formulas and syntax-directed rules for
proving assertions about programs and functions, our proof system includes two
rules of inference that allow deduction of properties of threads from invariants of
their programs. We call a thread trusted if the program it executes is known, else
we call the thread untrusted or adversarial. Using the ﬁrst rule (Section 4.2), we
may combine knowledge that a particular thread is executing a known program
with any invariant of the program to deduce that the formula in the invariant holds
forever. The second rule (Section 4.3) embodies our central idea of reasoning about
unknown, potentially adversarial, code by conﬁning it to interfaces: if we know that
an adversarial thread has access only to certain interfaces, then under certain con-
ditions, we can show that a common invariant of all those interfaces always holds
in the system, regardless of the manner in which the adversarial thread uses those
interfaces.
Formally, proofs establish one of two hypothetical judgments: Σ; Γ  ϕ and
Σ; Γ;Δ  μ. In both judgments Σ is a set of ﬁrst-order variables that may occur
free in the rest of the judgment, Γ is a list of assumed formulas of the temporal
logic and Δ contains assumed speciﬁcations of functions. A proof establishing either
Σ; Γ  ϕ or Σ; Γ;Δ  μ is parametric in all variables in Σ, i.e., it holds for all ground
instances of the variables.
Σ ::= · | Σ, x
Γ ::= · | Γ, ϕ
Δ ::= · | Δ, [f ]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ | Δ, {f}〈y, ub, ue, i〉ϕ
The judgment Σ; Γ  ϕ coincides with the standard hypothetical judgment of ﬁrst-
order classical logic with equality (we treat p @ u as an atomic formula p(u)), with
additional axioms to make time points a total order. Due to lack of space, we elide
the rules for establishing this judgment.
Assertions manifest in the judgment Σ; Γ;Δ  μ are established by an analysis
of the program in μ through rules described in Section 4.1. Additionally, there are
inference rules to combine reasoning in the temporal logic with reasoning about
assertions. For instance, if [e]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ and ϕ ⊃ ϕ′, then one of the rules of
inference allows deduction of [e]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ′. Such rules are common in program
logics and we elide them also.
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Σ;Γ;Δ 	 [a]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ
Σ;Γ;Δ 	 [act a]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ
PA
Σ;Γ;Δ 	 []〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ
Σ;Γ;Δ 	 {act a}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ
IA
Σ; Γ;Δ 	 []〈ub, um, i〉ϕ1 Σ;Γ;Δ 	 [e1]〈um, u′m, i, y〉ϕ2 Σ, y; Γ;Δ 	 [e2]〈u′m, ue, i, x〉ϕ3
Σ;Γ;Δ 	 [let(e1, y.e2)]〈ub, ue, i, x〉∃y.∃um.∃u′m.((ub < um < u′m < ue) ∧ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3)
PL
Σ; Γ;Δ 	 []〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ
Σ;Γ;Δ 	 []〈ub, um, i〉ψ1 Σ;Γ;Δ 	 {e1}〈um, ue, i〉ψ2 Σ, ub, um, ue, i; Γ, ub < um ≤ ue, ψ1, ψ2 	 ϕ
Σ;Γ;Δ 	 []〈ub, um, i〉ψ3 Σ;Γ;Δ 	 [e1]〈um, u′m, i, y〉ψ4
Σ, y; Γ;Δ 	 {e2}〈u′m, ue, i〉ψ5 Σ, ub, um, u′m, ue, i, y; Γ, ub < um < u′m ≤ ue, ψ3, ψ4, ψ5 	 ϕ
Σ;Γ;Δ 	 {let(e1, y.e2)}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ
IL
f(z)

= e Σ, y; Γ;Δ, [f ]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ 	 [e{y/z}]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ
Σ;Γ;Δ 	 [f ]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ
PF
f(z)

= e Σ, y; Γ;Δ, {f}〈y, ub, ue, i〉ϕ 	 {e{y/z}}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ
Σ;Γ;Δ 	 {f}〈y, ub, ue, i〉ϕ
IF
Fig. 3. Selected modular rules for establishing program speciﬁcations
4.1 Reasoning About Speciﬁcations of Programs
Representative rules for establishing program speciﬁcations are shown in Figure 3.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the rules of our proof system rely on the abstract
judgments [a]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ and []〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ (e.g., rule (PA)). The rules are mod-
ular: speciﬁcations of a program are established by combining speciﬁcations of
sub-programs. For instance, we may justify the rule (PL) as follows. In the con-
clusion of the rule we wish to establish a partial correctness assertion of the ex-
pression let(e1, y.e2). If this expression is active in thread i at time ub and re-
turns value x at time ue, then through an analysis of the operational semantics
it follows that at some time um after ub, e1 must have become active, then at a
later time u′m, e1 would have returned some value y to e2, which would have be-
come active, and ﬁnally at time ue, e2 would have returned x. So if []〈ub, um, i〉ϕ1,
[e1]〈um, u′m, i, y〉ϕ2, and [e2]〈u′m, ue, i, x〉ϕ3 all hold (as in the premises of the rule),
then ∃y.∃um.∃u′m.((ub < um < u′m < ue) ∧ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3) must hold. Observe that
it is necessary to existentially quantify the variables y, um, and u′m in the conclusion
because during reasoning, we cannot determine their exact values. This justiﬁes the
conclusion of the rule. Other rules for establishing partial correctness assertions can
be justiﬁed similarly.
Rules for establishing invariance assertions are more involved, but are also mod-
ular. We illustrate their justiﬁcation through the rule (IL). In the conclusion of the
rule we wish to establish an invariant that holds while let(e1, y.e2) executes. If this
expression is active in thread i at time ub but does not return until time ue, then
there are only three possibilities: (a) e1 does not start executing until time ue, (b)
e1 starts executing at some time um, but does not return until time ue, or (c) e1
starts executing at time um, returns at time u′m, e2 starts executing at time u′m,
but does not return until time ue. If we can show that ϕ holds in each of these
three cases, then ϕ is in invariant of let(e1, y.e2). The premises of the rule account
for exactly these three cases: the ﬁrst premise accounts for case (a), premises 2–4
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account for case (b), and the remaining premises account for case (c).
Rules (PF) and (IF) for proving partial correctness assertions and invariants
of functions check the corresponding speciﬁcation on the bodies of the respective
functions. In order to account for the possibility of recursion, we also assume the
function’s speciﬁcation when we check the body of the function by adding it to
the context Δ in the premises. It is not obvious that this approach is sound and
accounting for it complicates our proof of soundness (see Section 5).
Example 3. The invariant in Example 2 can be proved using the rules presented in
this section, related rules for other types of program expressions, and some straight-
forward axioms for relevant actions. We list two such axioms below, leaving the rest
to the full version of the paper. These axioms mean that the receive action recv
and administrative reductions do not insert anything into the access control ma-
trix. Soundness of such axioms is easy to prove, as has been demonstrated in prior
work [13,14].
 [recv]〈ub, ue, i, x〉 ∀u, k, f, p. ((ub < u ≤ ue) ⊃ (¬(Insert(i, (f, k, p)) @ u)))
 []〈ub, ue, i〉 ∀u, k, f, p. ((ub < u ≤ ue) ⊃ (¬(Insert(i, (f, k, p)) @ u)))
4.2 Reasoning About Trusted Threads
Next, we present the rule used to prove properties of trusted threads from knowledge
of their programs. In the logic, we say that HonestThread(I, e) if thread I executes
program expression e only. Let Start(I) @ u hold if at time u, thread I is ready
to execute, but has not performed any reduction. The following rule, based on the
Honesty rule in prior work on Protocol Composition Logic [13], allows us to prove
a property of thread I from an invariant of e if HonestThread(I, e).
Σ; Γ; ·  {e}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ(ub, ue, i)
Σ; Γ  HonestThread(I, e) Σ; Γ  Start(I) @ u
Σ;Γ  ∀u′. (u′ > u) ⊃ ϕ(u, u′, I) HONTH
The justiﬁcation for this rule is the following: since HonestThread(I, e) and Start(I) @
u, it must be the case that e is the active expression in I at time u. Further, since
e is the top-level program of I, it can never return. Hence, by the deﬁnition of
{e}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ(ub, ue, i), ϕ(u, u′, I) must hold for any u′ > u. We do not stipu-
late rules for proving either HonestThread(I, e) or Start(I) @ u since they codify
system-speciﬁc assumptions. Instead such formulas must be explicit hypotheses in
Γ, as illustrated below.
Example 4. We demonstrate an application of the (HONTH) rule on the invari-
ant of Example 2. Suppose that the teacher’s program is executing in thread i0
since the beginning of time (−∞). Since we know that the teacher’s program is
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teacher body, and we assume that this is the only program the teacher executes,
we can assume that:
(A) HonestThread(i0, teacher body)
(B) ∀i. (Owner(i,Teacher) ⊃ (i = i0))
(C) Start(i0) @ −∞
Applying the rule (HONTH) to the invariant from Example 2 and (A), (C) above,
we can conclude that
∀u′. (u′ > −∞) ⊃ (∀u, f, k. ((−∞ < u ≤ u′) ⊃ (¬Insert(i0, (f, k, ad)) @ u)))
Simplifying and combining with (B), we get
∀i, u. Owner(i,Teacher) ⊃ ¬(Insert(i, (f, k, ad)) @ u)
In simple words, the statement above means that the teacher never inserts the
administrate permission into the access control matrix, which is property (1) of the
proof outline at the end of Section 3.2.
4.3 Reasoning About Interface-Conﬁned Untrusted Threads
As opposed to trusted threads, whose security properties may be established by
analysis of their programs, the programs of untrusted or adversarial threads are not
known, so proving their security properties may seem impossible. Yet, in practice,
security of systems often relies on conﬁnement of behavior of untrusted threads.
For instance, property (2) in the proof outline of Section 3.2, which states that a
thread must have administrate permission to add a permission, holds of all threads
including those that are untrusted, e.g., threads run by students and adversaries.
The property holds because the only interface that allows modiﬁcation to the ac-
cess control matrix (permadd) checks for the administrate permission. In general,
relevant properties of untrusted threads can often be proved by an analysis of the
interfaces they have access to, even if we do not know the exact code the threads
execute. In this section, we develop reasoning principles to perform such reasoning
in the proof system of our logic. We deﬁne an interface, denoted F ,G, as a set of
functions. In general, an untrusted thread that is conﬁned to F may construct a
new set of functions G that call functions of F and themselves and combine calls to
functions of F and G in any way it chooses. To formally represent such an adversary,
we need a few deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (F-conﬁned expressions) Given an interface F , we call an ex-
pression e F-conﬁned if the following hold: (a) All occurrences of call in e have
the form call(f, t), where f ∈ F , and (b) act does not occur in e.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (F-limited functions) Given an interface F , we call a set of
functions G = {gk | gk(y) = ek} F-limited if the body ek of each function is (F ∪G)-
conﬁned.
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Deﬁnition 4.3 (F-conﬁned thread) A (untrusted) thread I is said to be F-
conﬁned if I executes a program e and there is a F-limited interface G such that e
is (F ∪ G)-conﬁned. The predicate Confined(I,F) holds iﬀ I is F-conﬁned. 2
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Compositional formula) A formula ϕ(ub, ue, i), possibly con-
taining the free variables ub, ue, i, is called compositional if ∀ub, um, ue, i.
((ub < um ≤ ue) ∧ ϕ(ub, um, i) ∧ ϕ(um, ue, i)) ⊃ ϕ(ub, ue, i).
Roughly, a formula ϕ(ub, ue, i) describing some property over an interval (ub, ue]
is compositional if whenever the formula holds on two adjoining intervals, it also
holds on the union of the intervals. In general, if ϕ(ub, ue, i) encodes the fact that
a safety property holds throughout the interval (ub, ue], then ϕ(ub, ue, i) will be
compositional.
We codify our reasoning principles for untrusted, interface-conﬁned threads in
the following rule:
(ϕ(ub, ue, i) compositional)
·; Γ; ·  []〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ(ub, ue, i) ∀f ∈ F . (·; Γ; ·  {f}〈y, ub, ue, i〉ϕ(ub, ue, i))
∀f ∈ F . (·; Γ; ·  [f ]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ(ub, ue, i)) Σ; Γ  Confined(I,F)
Σ; Γ,Γ′  ∀ue. ϕ(−∞, ue, I)
RES
The informal justiﬁcation for the rule (RES) is that, owing to its conﬁnement to F ,
the reduction of I up to any time point ue can be split into calls to functions in F
interspersed with administrative reductions of the adversary’s choosing. Since ϕ is
a partial correctness assertion of all functions in F (fourth premise) and adminis-
trative reductions (second premise), as well an invariant of all functions in F (third
premise), it must hold over all these splits. Therefore, due to the compositionality
of ϕ (ﬁrst premise), ϕ(−∞, ue, I) must hold. The formal justiﬁcation of this rule is
a non-trivial part of the soundness theorem (Section 5) because we must consider
all F-conﬁned programs that the thread I may execute.
Example 5. We sketch a proof of property (2) from the outline at the end of
Section 3.2. The property states that if a thread can insert a permission for ﬁle f
into the access control matrix then the thread must have the administrate permission
on f , or, formally,
∀i, f, k, k′, p, u, s. ((Insert(i, (f, k′, p)) @ u) ∧ Owner(i, k))
⊃ ∃u′. (u′ < u ∧ (isACM(s) @ u′) ∧ ((f, k, ad) ∈ s))
2 The restriction that the untrusted thread may not execute any actions directly may seem to limit expres-
siveness of our model because we may want to allow the untrusted thread access to some actions. However,
this is not really a limitation because we may give the thread access to interfaces that execute the allowed
actions immediately. For instance, to allow an adversary access to the send action, we may give it the
interface f(x)

= send x.
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where isACM(s) means that the (current) access control matrix is the set of tuples
s. We prove this property using the (RES) rule. Deﬁne
ϕ(ub, ue, i) = ∀f, k, k′, p, u, s.
((ub < u ≤ ue) ∧ (Insert(i, (f, k′, p)) @ u) ∧ Owner(i, k))
⊃ ∃u′. (u′ < u ∧ (isACM(s) @ u′) ∧ ((f, k, ad) ∈ s))
Then, using the rules presented in Section 4.1, we can prove the following for the
interface F deﬁned in Figure 2:
∀g ∈ F . ({g}〈y, ub, ue, i〉ϕ(ub, ue, i))
∀g ∈ F . ([g]〈y, ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ(ub, ue, i))
[]〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ(ub, ue, i)
Further, since all threads are assumed to be conﬁned to the interface F , we can
assume that ∀i. Confined(i,F). Finally, it can be easily checked that ϕ(ub, ue, i) is
compositional. Hence, by rule (RES) we conclude that ∀i.∀ue. ϕ(−∞, ue, i). This
implies the formula at the beginning of this example in a straightforward manner.
5 Semantics and Soundness Theorem
We formally deﬁne semantics of temporal formulas ϕ and assertions μ with respect
to traces and show that our proof rules are sound, i.e., any formula or assertion
proved using the rules is valid in the semantics. This provides foundational justiﬁ-
cation for the reasoning principles of Section 4.
Semantics. Since our programming model and the logic of programs are paramet-
ric in the syntax of terms and predicates, we assume that interpretations of these
entities are given. Let [[t]] denote the semantic interpretation of the term t in some
domain and let .= denote equality in the domain. For interpreting atomic formulas,
we assume the existence of a Boolean valued function V (T , u, p) (T is a trace, u
is a ground time point, and p is a ground atomic formula) such that [[t]] .= [[t′]] im-
plies V (T , u, p{t/x}) = V (T , u, p{t′/x}). Given these assumptions, we may deﬁne
the semantics T |= ϕ of ground temporal formulas ϕ in a standard manner. For
example,
• T |= p @ u iﬀ V (T , u, p).
• T |= ϕ ∧ ψ iﬀ T |= ϕ and T |= ψ.
In order to deﬁne semantics of assertions, we need a notion of the suﬃx of a
trace, also called a subtrace.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Subtraces) Let T be the trace
u0−→ C0 u1−→ C1 . . . un−→ Cn
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For any k ≥ 0, we deﬁne the truncation of T to k, written trunc(T , k) as the trace
which contains only the last k+1 conﬁgurations of T . If k > n then trunc(T , k) =
T .
Semantics of ground assertions μ are represented through the judgment T , n |=
μ, which roughly means that the assertion μ holds in the subtrace trunc(T , n).
The additional information n is needed to prove soundness for recursive functions.
One representative clause of the deﬁnition of T , n |= μ is shown below; others are
described in the full version of this paper.
- T , n |= {e}〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ holds iﬀ T |= ϕ{u′b/ub}{u′e/ue}{I/i} whenever the fol-
lowing pattern matches the subtrace trunc(T , n) for some u′ < u′b, there is no
reduction in thread I in the interval (u′, u′b], and the stack of I has suﬃx K
throughout the interval (u′b, u
′
e].
. . .
u′−→ σ  I ;K ; e
Finally, we deﬁne semantics of hypothetical judgments of the proof system.
- T |= (Σ; Γ  ϕ) if for every grounding substitution θ with domain Σ, T |= Γθ
implies T |= ϕθ.
- T |= (Σ; Γ;Δ  μ) if for every grounding substitution θ with domain Σ and every
n, T |= Γθ and T , n |= Δθ imply T , n |= μθ.
Soundness. We show that any hypothetical judgment established using the proof
system of Section 4 is semantically valid, if the axioms chosen to reason about the
assertions [a]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ and []〈ub, ue, i〉 are valid in the semantics. As a result,
any instance of our reasoning principles is sound if we choose sound axioms for
actions and administrative reductions.
Theorem 5.2 (Soundness) Suppose that each assumed axiom (e.g., about the as-
sertions [a]〈ub, ue, i, x〉ϕ and []〈ub, ue, i〉ϕ) is sound. Then for every T ,
(i) Σ; Γ  ϕ implies T |= (Σ; Γ  ϕ).
(ii) Σ; Γ;Δ  μ implies T |= (Σ; Γ;Δ  μ).
The proof of soundness proceeds by a lexicographic induction, ﬁrst on the max-
imum number of (RES) rules in any path in the given derivation, and then on the
depth of the derivation. A simpler, more obvious induction on the depth of the
derivation does not work because in the (RES) rule the proof that the program e
being executed by the thread I satisﬁes invariant ϕ may be arbitrarily deeper than
the proofs of the premises. Another technical diﬃculty arises due to the possibility
of recursive functions: for the rules (PF) and (IF) of Figure 3, we must subinduct
on the number n in the deﬁnition of T , n |= μ.
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6 Rely-Guarantee Reasoning
Often, a security property relies on speciﬁc behavior of threads that can be ascer-
tained only if the security property itself holds in the past. For example, consider
property (3) from the outline at the end of Section 3.2: only the teacher ever obtains
administrate permissions. Reasoning that this property holds at any point of time
relies on the property having been true at all points of time in the past. Similarly,
the analysis of secrecy of keys in security protocols often relies both on the keys
having remained secret in the past as illustrated in prior work [33].
The rely-guarantee method is a general technique for proving such properties for
concurrently executing threads [27,21,15]. Summarily, suppose ϕ is a property of
state. The rely-guarantee method envisages that in order to show that ϕ holds in all
states of the system’s execution, it suﬃces to prove the following three properties:
(A) ϕ holds initially.
(B) There is a class of properties ψ(i), indexed by threads i, such that for any
action that i may perform, if ϕ holds in the state preceding the action, then
ψ(i) holds immediately after i executes the action.
(C) If ϕ holds in a state and ψ(i) holds in the next state for all i, then ϕ holds in
the next state.
Here, we show how, for a wide class of properties, the rely-guarantee technique
is a special case of the reasoning principles presented in Section 4. Suppose ϕ(u) is
a property that we wish to establish for all time points u. Assume that a predicate
ι(i) identiﬁes threads of interest and there is a thread-speciﬁc property ψ(u, i) such
that the following analogues of the properties (A)–(C) hold:
(A’) ϕ(−∞)
(B’) ∀i, u. (ι(i) ∧ ∀u′ < u. ϕ(u′)) ⊃ ψ(u, i)
(C’) (ϕ(u1) ∧ ¬ϕ(u2) ∧ (u1 < u2)) ⊃
∃i, u3. (u1 < u3 ≤ u2) ∧ ι(i) ∧ ¬ψ(u3, i) ∧ ∀u4 ∈ (u1, u3). ϕ(u4)
Then, we can prove using elementary logical reasoning that ∀u.ϕ(u) (see the next
Theorem). Roughly, condition (B’) is analogous to property (B) and it may be
established through invariants. For instance, if ι(i) = i ∈ I, where I is a set
of trusted threads, then by rule (HONTH), condition (B’) holds if the following
assertion holds for all programs e that threads in I may execute.
{e}〈ub, ue, i〉 ∀u ∈ (ub, ue]. (∀u′ < u. ϕ(u′)) ⊃ ψ(u, i)
If, on the other hand, ι(i) = 	 (i.e., all threads are of interest), then we may prove
(B’) using the (RES) rule. Condition (C’) means that if there is a violation of ϕ at
time u2 but this was not the case at time u1 (u1 < u2) then there must be a ﬁrst
violation at some time u3 that is caused due to a violation of the thread speciﬁc
property by some thread satisfying ι. This is stronger than property (C), but holds
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for properties ϕ that depend solely on state. In general, a rigorous proof of a
condition like (C’) requires induction over traces. Since we do not have a principle
for induction on trace in our formalism, we must, in some cases, derive (C’) from
an axiom, which must then be proved sound in the semantic model by induction on
traces.
Theorem 6.1 (Rely-guarantee) Conditions (A’)–(C’) as above imply
∀u. ϕ(u) in the proof system of Section 4.
Proof. By a straightforward analysis in the temporal logic. 
Example 6. We outline brieﬂy how property (3) mentioned at the end of Sec-
tion 3.2 can be proved using the rely-guarantee method described above. Deﬁne the
predicate HasOnly(K, f, p, u) to mean that only principals in set K have permission
p on ﬁle f at time u:
HasOnly(K, f, p, u) = ∀k, s. ((isACM(s) @ u) ∧ ((f, k, p) ∈ s)) ⊃ (k ∈ K)
Then, we can prove by an induction on traces that the following axiom (PERM) is
sound:
∀K, f, u1, u2, p.
(HasOnly(K, f, p, u1) ∧ ¬HasOnly(K, f, p, u2) ∧ (u1 < u2))
⊃ (∃i, k′, u3. (u1 < u3 ≤ u2) ∧ (k′ ∈ K) ∧ (Insert(i, (f, k′, p)) @ u3) ∧
∀u4. (u1 < u4 < u3) ⊃ HasOnly(K, f, p, u4))
Intuitively, the axiom states that if at time u1 only principals in K have permission
p on ﬁle f and at later time u2 this is not the case, then there must be a ﬁrst time
u3 when some thread i inserted permission p on f for a principal k′ ∈ K.
The property (3) we wish to prove can be formalized as ∀u.ϕ(u) where
ϕ(u) = ∀n. HasOnly({Teacher}, f [n], ad, u)
Following the rely-guarantee method described above, deﬁne
ι(i) = 	
ψ(u, i) = ∀n, k′. (k′ = Teacher) ⊃ ¬(Insert(i, (f [n], k′, ad)) @ u)
By Theorem 6.1, if we can prove (A’)–(C’) for the ϕ, ψ, and ι deﬁned above, then
there is a proof of the required property ∀u. ϕ(u). We analyze each of these condi-
tions. (A’) is the formula ϕ(−∞) = ∀n. HasOnly({Teacher}, f [n],
ad,−∞), which holds because we assumed that initially only Teacher has adminis-
trate permissions. (Technically, (A’) is an axiom in our example.) After substitution
of ϕ, ψ, and ι, (C’) is easily seen to be equivalent to axiom (PERM) written earlier
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and, therefore, has an immediate proof. The statement of (B’) is:
∀i, u. (∀u′. ((u′ < u) ⊃ ∀n. HasOnly({Teacher}, f [n], ad, u′)))
⊃ ∀n, k′. (k′ = Teacher) ⊃ ¬(Insert(i, (f [n], k′, ad)) @ u)
This follows from the properties proved in Examples 4 and 5.
7 Future Work
This paper makes signiﬁcant progress towards developing a systematic foundation
for compositional system security. We plan to extend this work in several directions.
So far, we have considered reasoning principles for ﬁrst-order programs where code
cannot be passed as arguments or returned from expressions. However, many sys-
tems rely on passing code either as data or through pointers. To model and to
establish security properties of such applications, we propose to extend the formal-
ism with higher-order constructs and develop associated compositional reasoning
principles. While this paper has focused on the technical foundations of the theory,
we plan to apply this framework to develop a systematic basis for web security,
to formalize attacker models for web browsers proposed in the literature [4] and
develop new ones, and to build an understanding of relevant security policies, end-
to-end security properties, attacks in the wild, and ways to defend and prove web
applications secure against these attacks.
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